Who is fighting in Myanmar’s multi-front civil war? | Conflict News

Myanmar has entered the sixth year of a brutal civil war that the military regime, which seized control of the country in 2021, is increasingly confident it can win.

The conflict was triggered when the country’s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing ousted an elected government and detained civilian leaders, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.

That power grab reversed a decade of fragile democratic transition and produced not only a military dictatorship but a nationwide uprising — neither of which was new to this Southeast Asian nation of about 55 million people.

Since Burma’s independence (as the country was then known) from the British in 1948, the state centre has been in near-continuous conflict with ethnic minority communities who call the country’s highland borderlands their home.

Many were promised autonomy after decolonisation, but that never materialised.

The military and its leaders have been tightly woven into the country’s social and political fabric for more than six decades and have come to oversee a vast business empire that encompasses everything from natural resource extraction to beer sales.

Bolstered by arms sales from China and Russia, the military now deploys fighter jets, attack helicopters, tanks and a growing arsenal of drones in its civil war fight.

Many of its adversaries were once protesters who brandished little but laminated signs with anti-coup messages; some had slingshots.

But a bloody crackdown by the military drove many peaceful demonstrators to seek combat training from the seasoned armed ethnic rebels in the borderlands, which fused decades-old struggles for an autonomous identity with a mass push for democracy in the aftermath of 2021.

After years of revolt, the military faced a sprawling resistance unlike any in its history. Doubts even crept in over whether the military could survive.

Now, amid a resurgence – on the back of atrocities and mass subscription – and factionalism among opponents, the balance of power is tilting back in the military’s favour.

But the war looks set to grind on.

So far, international conflict monitor ACLED estimates more than 96,000 people have been killed in Myanmar’s civil war, while the United Nations says at least 3.6 million have been displaced.

To grasp the breadth and complexity of Myanmar’s civil war, it helps to see four broad camps in the war: the military regime, led by Min Aung Hlaing; a range of ethnic armed groups; post-coup forces aligned with the shadow administration of the National Unity Government (NUG); and newer resistance groups fighting to transform the political order.

One thing is constant in the civil war — alliances are fluid and sometimes collapse into conflict.

Through this kaleidoscopic lens, Myanmar’s political and military dynamics – and possible trajectories – come into focus.

The military

The Myanmar military’s character – a mix of brutality and rigid obedience – dates back to its formation under Japanese imperial forces ‘ tutelage during World War II. At the military’s core is an ideology that casts the armed forces as guardians of an almost exclusively Buddhist society, with the ethnic Bamar majority at the centre of the nation.

The military seeks to preserve Bamar dominance while absorbing the country’s many ethnic minorities into a centralised state in a subordinate role, said Morgan Michaels of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), based at IISS-Asia.

Michaels estimates the military fields between 150,000 and 250,000 soldiers, with up to 100,000 conscripts bolstering military ranks since draft laws were rushed into force in 2024 after rebel fighters inflicted heavy losses on the battlefield.

Conscription, together with pressure from Beijing on the ethnic armies situated on the China-Myanmar border, has halted earlier rapid advances against the military.

Reduced weapons flows to resistance groups, support from armed militias for the military, as well as improved tactics, have helped the military claw back much lost ground, Michaels said.

Long accused of attacking civilians, the military’s air campaign has also evolved into “a high tempo of intelligence-driven strikes” targeting personnel, infrastructure and logistics, Michaels added.

On the other side of the conflict, the myriad opposition forces stacked against the military have “failed to unite”, he said.

They may even be “incapable of strategic evolution”, he said.

Though the military is “ideologically cohesive”, Michaels said, “deep-seated disaffection” with commander Min Aung Hlaing could raise the prospect of internal tensions as a future route for the conflict to navigate.

People’s Defence Force (PDF)

The 2021 coup – and the bloodshed that followed as troops fired on street demonstrations against military rule – pushed protesters to take up arms, nationalising what has now become a protracted civil war.

Forming resistance groups, they captured swaths of countryside in the central drylands and the south of the country. Others sought out and fought under the leadership of ethnic armies in exchange for training and weapons with which to fight the military.

These resistance groups, known as the People’s Defence Force (PDF), nominally operate under the leadership of the National Unity Government (NUG), a shadow government formed by Myanmar lawmakers removed by the military coup.

In fighting the PDF, the military found itself confronting its own ethnic Bamar – historically the military’s core support base – face to face.

In 2022, the NUG claimed roughly 250 PDF battalions, suggesting about 100,000 personnel, although this likely includes noncombat roles, said Armed Conflict Location and Event Data’s (ACLED) Asia Pacific senior analyst Su Mon.

With casualties mounting, recruitment slowing and some troops under the command of ethnic armed groups, the number of PDF fighters is likely lower, said Su Mon, noting that the PDF “appear to be managing a gradual loss of strength”.

The PDF sources their weapons from battlefield seizures from the military, surplus from ethnic allies, sales on the black market, homemade weapons production, and defecting soldiers. But those supplies have tightened, and so has funding to buy weapons – from diaspora donations overseas, local taxation and online fundraising campaigns.

Originally, the PDF was “envisioned as a national army, even as a potential substitute for the Myanmar military,” said Su Mon.

But the NUG has struggled to unify the disparate militias that comprise the PDF or provide sufficient resources to help make it a force that could be recognised as truly national.

“Although the NUG has attempted to bring these scattered groups under a unified command structure, it continues to struggle,” Su Mon said.

Ethnic armed groups

Ethnic armed groups have dealt the most serious blows to the military regime.

But these groups are not uniformly aligned with the pro-democracy movement, the PDF or the NUG, and their goals often diverge from one ethnic group to another.

In many cases, the military coup has sharpened differences among the ethnic groups themselves, of which there are about 20.

After decades of conflict, some have fractured and fought each other. While some remain focused on autonomy, others are driven more by financial interests or the influence of neighbouring China. For some, the current period of revolution burns with urgent necessity. For others, it is more of a bargaining chip for sectional interests.

The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) illustrates this tension.

This Mandarin-speaking ethnic Kokang force, with 8,000 to 10,000 fighters, initially embraced the uprising against the Myanmar military, forming a mixed-ethnicity brigade of anti-military protesters turned rebel fighters. But after capturing the city of Lashio during the 2023 offensive, the MNDAA handed its hard-won prize back to the military under pressure from Beijing.

The MNDAA now faces a tense standoff with a former ethnic ally for the leftovers of the territory it took from the military.

Amara Thiha, an analyst at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, said the MNDAA’s “most significant battlefield achievements” against Myanmar’s military “are reversible through Beijing’s diplomatic preference”.

IISS’s Michaels described the MNDAA as “more akin to a heavily armed cartel with administrative capacities rather than an ideologically or politically motivated armed movement”.

Other ethnic armed groups occupy a middle ground, pursuing autonomy while navigating pressure from both China and rivals.

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) stands out as one of the most capable and most closely aligned with the broader resistance and its pro-democracy aspirations, said Amara Thiha.

With up to 30,000 troops and revenue streams from rare earth mining, the KIA has integrated operations with other forces that emerged in the aftermath of the military coup.

In the country’s eastern Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) has built a 40,000-strong force equipped with artillery, armoured vehicles and drones, while also developing governance structures in liberated areas that resemble a proto-state.

The AA’s long-term ambitions may include independence, depending on how the conflict evolves, said Bangkok-based security analyst Anthony Davis.

The AA’s rise is tied to the fate of the Rohingya, a Muslim minority driven into Bangladesh during a 2017 military campaign widely described as genocidal. More than 750,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar to refugee camps in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar, where they still languish.

Amid reports of AA abuses and Rohingya militancy against the AA, the future of Rohingya communities – both in Rakhine and neighbouring Bangladesh – remains uncertain.

Other major players among the ethnic armed groups include the Karen National Union, with about 15,000 troops along the Myanmar-Thai border, and the United Wa State Army, the country’s best-equipped ethnic force, with roughly 30,000 fighters on the Myanmar-China border and strong backing from Beijing.

Other resistance groups

The emergence of the PDF was followed by a cascade of independent fighting forces, from small unit village watches to larger regional alliances, some of which have viewed the revolution as not only a chance to transform the inequities of an old political system but also to address ethnic discrimination.

Examples include the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force in eastern Kayah State, the Chin Brotherhood in western Myanmar, and the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, led by a prominent poet who espouses equality among ethnicities, as a Bamar force.

In November 2025, these nation-spanning forces coalesced into the 19-member Spring Revolution Alliance, with a combined strength of about 10,000 fighters.

“Many of these groups are led by younger activists with clearly articulated political objectives,” Su Mon said.

What next for Myanmar’s civil war?

Observers expect regime leader Min Aung Hlaing to remain in charge of the military, and potentially transition his role into that of an unelected presidency.

Barring a major shock, such as an internal coup inside the military or a shift in China’s policy towards the regime, IISS’s Michaels expects the military to continue its battlefield gains this year, followed by “deeper advances” over the next decade.

A ceasefire or peace talks could give opposition forces space to consolidate, he said, but otherwise “their positions will be gradually eroded in the coming years until negotiations are forced upon them”.

Su Mon also points to mounting strain on the PDF due to a lack of strong political leadership, as military offensives intensify amid economic hardships.

Some PDF battalions have reportedly disarmed because of these pressures, she said.

“Without improved institutional support, resources, or mechanisms for replenishment, many PDF groups risk gradually dwindling over time,” she said.